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Criminal Procedure-Capital Sentencing by a Standardless Jury
Since 1967 there have been no executions in the United States.'

Hundreds of men languish on death row awaiting the final decision by
the Supreme Court as to the constitutionality of the death penalty.'

Although the Court has not yet decided that issue, 3 it recently repelled
a constitutional attack on the trial procedures employed by most states
in capital cases. In McGautha v. California4 the Court rejected defense

contentions that the practice of allowing capital juries absolute discretion, uncontrolled by any standards, violated the due process clause of

the fourteenth amendment. 5
On the nightof February 14, 1967, William McGautha and an

accomplice robbed and murdered the proprietor of a small market in
Los Angeles, California. McGautha was arrested, tried, and convicted
of murder in the first degree.6 In accordance with the California bifurcated trial procedure for capital cases, McGautha's sentence of death
was determined in a separate jury proceeding subsequent to trial on the
issue of guilt. 7 In the penalty phase of his trial, the jury was given no
guidelines for selecting a proper sentence; instead, it was instructed that
the "whole matter of determining . . .the penalty

. . .

shall be fixed

to the judgment, conscience, and absolute discretion of the jury."'
'U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1970, at 161
(9 1st ed.).
'As of December 31, 1969, 609 men were awaiting execution. Id. at 159.
'The Court has agreed to hear arguments this term on whether the death penalty constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment. E.g., Aikens v. California, 403 U.S. 952 (197 1).
'402 U.S. 183 (197 1).
'The Court also upheld the constitutionality of a single-verdict procedure in a capital trial,
which requires a jury to determine guilt and punishment simultaneously and thus compels a defendant to choose between the exercise of his privilege against self incrimination and the presentation
of his own testimony relevant to the issue of sentencing. 402 U.S. at 208-20.
'McGautha's accomplice, William Wilkinson, was tried with him and found guilty of first
degree murder. In the penalty proceeding the jury set Wilkinson's sentence at life imprisonment.
Id. at 186-91.

7Id. at 187-91. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (vest 1970) provides that the trier of fact in a
capital case shall fix the penalty to be imposed on a convicted defendant in a proceeding separate
from and subsequent to trial on the issue of guilt. In the penalty trial evidence may be presented of
the circumstances surrounding the crime, of the defendant's background and history, and of any
facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. The choice of penalty-life imprisonment or
death-is left to the absolute discretion of the trier of fact.
1402 U.S. at 190. The California Supreme Court, ruling on the scope of permissible instructions to a jury in the penalty phase of a capital trial, has stated:
IT]he jury must not be misled into thinking . . . that their discretion in the selection of
a penalty, as between either of the two alternatives, is in any way limited or circumscribed
by law. Their discretion within that area is absolute and they should be so informed.
People v. Friend, 47 Cal. 2d 749, 765, 306 P.2d 463,473 (1957).
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James Crampton was convicted and sentenced to death by an Ohio
jury for the slaying of his wife. Unlike McGautha, Crampton was sentenced to death in a single trial procedure in which the issues of guilt and
punishment were simultaneously decided by the jury.' The Ohio jury,
like most capital juries in the United States, received no guidelines from
the court as to the proper factors to be considered in arriving at a
sentence but was simply instructed "to -arrive at a just verdict.""0
McGautha and Crampton both argued to the Supreme Court that
the practice of allowing a jury in a capital case unbridled discretion to
decide between life imprisonment and the death penalty violates the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. They contended that a lay
jury, unguided by any standards and unfamiliar with the rationale of the
sentencing process, can only guess at the relevant criteria to be considered in deciding on an appropriate sentence. Such a jury, argued the
petitioners, is most likely to base its decision on constitutionally impermissible factors such as impulse, prejudice, or emotional feelings toward
the defendant. In rejecting these contentions, the Supreme Court stressed
the continued efforts of authorities throughout history, "uniformly unsuccessful, to identify before the fact those homicides for which the
slayer should die."" The Court noted that most American jurisdictions
in response to the seemingly impossible task of defining capital crimes
eliminated the category of crimes for which the death penalty was mandatory and in its place substituted the practice of granting juries the
option of specifying capital punishment or life imprisonment." The
Court argued that such a change in favor of leniency can hardly be said
to prejudice a defendant. "In light of history, experience, and present
limitations of human knowledge," the McGautha Court concluded, "it
'402 U.S. at 192.
"Brief for Appellant (Crampton) at 6, McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). The jury
was charged, however, to "[clonsider all the evidence and make your finding with intelligence and
impartiality, and without bias, sympathy, or prejudice so that the state of Ohio and the defendant
will feel that their case was fairly and impartially tried." 402 U.S. at 195.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that "whether or not a recommendation of mercy shall
be made upon finding an accused guilty of murder in the first degree is a matter vested fully and
exclusively in the discretion of the jury." State v. Ellis, 98 Ohio 21, 120 N.E. 218 (1918).
11402 U.S. at 197.
"Id. at 199. Tennessee in 1837 became the first American jurisdiction to give juries sentencing
discretion in capital cases. Ch. 29, § 1, [1837] Tenn. Acts 55. California conferred this power on
its juries in murder cases in 1874. Ch. 508, § 1, [1874] Cal. Amendatory Acts 457. Ohio enacted
a similar provision in 1898. Senate Bill 504, § 1, [1898] Ohio Laws 223. The federal government
followed suit in 1897. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Jan. 15, 1897, ch.
29, § 1,29 Stat. 487).
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is quite impossible to say that committing to the untramelled discretion
of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is
13
offensive to anything in the Constitution."'
In Winston v. United States14 the Supreme Court was called upon
to interpret a federal murder statute which provided no guidelines for
the jury to consider in selecting the applicable sentence.' 5 The trial judge
had instructed the jury that if they found the defendant guilty, they must
also find the existence of mitigating circumstances before returning a
verdict of life imprisonment. In finding such instructions to be erroneous, the Court declared:
The act does not itself prescribe, nor authorize the court to prescribe,
any rule defining or circumscribing the exercise of this right; but commits the whole matter of its exercise to the judgment and the consciences of the jury. . . . How far considerations of age, sex, ignorance,
illness, or intoxication, of human passion or weakness, of sympathy or
clemency, or the irrevocableness of an executed sentence of death, or
an apprehension that explanatory facts may exist which have not been
brought to light, or any other consideration whatever, should be allowed weight in deciding the question whether the accused should or
should not be capitally punished, is committed by the act of Congress
to the sound discretion of the jury, and of the jury alone."6
Subsequent to Winston the Court in Andres v. United States 7 approved
instructions concerning the same statute which informed the jury that
the power to recommend mercy was peculiarly within their realm and
that "in this connection the Court cannot extend or prescribe to you any
definite rule defining the exercise of this power, but commits the entire
matter of its exercise to your judgment."' 8 At first glance these two
decisions seem explicitly to sanction a lack of jury guidelines in the
sentencing process of a capital trial. One must note, however, that the
Court in Winston and Andres was called upon only to interpret the
statute provided by Congress and not to pass specifically on its constitu"402 U.S. at 207.
"172 U.S. 303 (1899).
18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1970).
16172 U.S. at 313.
7333 U.S. 740 (1948).
18d. at 743 nA.
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tionality. Prior to McGautha the Court had never addressed itself to a
fourteenth amendment objection concerning the use of unbridled discretion by a jury in a capital case. 9
It is well settled that a trial judge has wide discretion, within the
maximum and minimum penalties prescribed by law, to determine the
proper punishment for a convicted defendant. In Williams v. New
York 20 the Supreme Court recognized this authority by affirming a trial
judge's decision in a capital case to disregard the jury recommendation
of mercy and instead impose the death sentence. More recently the Court
had occasion to note:
Sentencing judges are vested with a wide discretion in the exceedingly
difficult task of determining the appropriate punishment in the countless variety of situations that appear. The Constitution permits qualitative differences in meting out punishment and there is no requirement
that two persons convicted of the same offense receive identical sent21
ences.
The appellants in McGautha did not even challenge the wide discretion
given a judge in the sentencing process. They argued that such a discretion was constitutionally invalid only if it were accorded to a jury.
There may be valid reasons why "due process of law" should allow
a judge more discretion than a jury in the area of sentencing. He is, at
least, a professional sentencer, and the fact that he sentences a large
number of offenders promotes some consistency in the punishment
which he hands down. Furthermore, a judge presumably has in mind the
goals of wise penology and is less likely to base his sentence on an intense
dislike of the defendant or on some similar visceral impulse. 22 Nevertheless, it is at least arguable that neither judge nor jury should be allowed
to make such an awesome decision without the aid of controlling stan"The identical issues decided by the Supreme Court in McGautha were briefed and argued but
not decided in Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970). See id. at 267 n.4.

20337 U.S. 241 (1949).
2'Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970).
M'The judge very often perceives the stimulus that moves the jury, but does not yield
to it. Indeed it is interesting how often the judge describes with sensitivity a factor which
he then excludes from his own considerations. Somehow the combination of official role,
tradition, discipline, and repeated experience with the task make of the judge one kind
of decider. The perennial amateur, layman jury cannot be so quickly domesticated to
official role and tradition; it remains accessible to stimuli which the judge will exclude.
H. KALVEN & E. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 497-98 (1966), cited in Brief for NAACP Legal
Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae at 37 n.43, Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1968).
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dards. While a judge is not as susceptible to the basic prejudices which
are likely to infect a jury, his decisions are affected by his own individual
predilections concerning the motives of criminology. Consequently,
there is a wide disparity between sentences handed down by different
judges confronted with similar factual situations. A cataloging by the
legislature of the relevant criteria to be considered in the sentencing
process would tend to eliminate this disparity and insure fairness and
even-handed treatment for defendants convicted of capital crimes.
At the state level the scope of appellate review of the exercise of
discretion afforded a trial judge in the sentencing process is varied.
Thirteen states have specifically provided by statute for appellate review
of sentencing on the merits, and a few states have adopted such a practice
by judicial authority.2 Four states have established special courts which
sit solely for review of sentences imposed by judges.2 4 Appellate review
of judicial seiiiencing in the federal system seems to be minimal. The
Supreme Court has stated that it has no authority to review sentences
handed down by a federal trial judge,2 but it has nevertheless exercised
such authority on a few occasions. One such instance was in North
Carolina v. Pearce,2 where the Supreme Court limited the amount of
discretion available to a trial judge in sentencing a defendant who had
won the right to a second trial. The Court held that if a more severe
sentence is imposed by the trial judge on retrial, he must affirmatively
state his reasons for doing so, and the reasons must be grounded in the
evidence produced at the second trial. In a number of instances the Court
has overturned sentences where questionable information concerning a
defendant's background was made available to the trial judge and where
the defendant was not represented by counsel. Thus, one may conclude
that while it is unusual for a sentence imposed by a trial judge to be
overturned by an appellate court, that possibility exists and serves as a
restraining influence on the exercise of discretion by a trial judge. However, there are virtually no restraints on the exercise of discretion by a
"AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES

14-15 (1968).
21CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-194 to -196 (Supp. 1965); MAINE REV. STAT, ANN, tit.
15, §§ 2141-2144 (Supp. 1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, §§ 152-158 (1966); MASS. GEN, LAWS
ANN. ch. 278, §§ 28A-28D (1959).
2Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958).
26395 U.S. 711 (1969).
2'Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); Speeht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Townsend
v. Burke, 335 U.S. 736 (1948).
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capital jury in determining a sentence. Only four states allow appellate
review of a jury's sentence in a death case. 28 At least three states, including California, allow the trial judge to set aside a death verdict brought
in by a jury, but if he fails to act the state appellate court lacks the
authority to exercise such power. 29 Thus, it appears that in most capital
sentencing procedures the jury possesses an unbridled discretion, the
exercise of which is unreviewable, to determine the proper sentence.
In Giaccio v. Pennsylvania3 the Supreme Court ruled that an 1860
Pennsylvania statute which allowed the jury to exercise broad discretion
in assessing costs against an acquitted defendant 3' violated the due process clause. Although Giaccio was acquitted of a criminal charge, the jury
exercised its prerogative to assess against him the cost of his own prosecution. The statute upon which the jury relied contained no guidelines
for determining when costs should be assessed against a defendant. The
Supreme Court declared that such a grant of arbitrary power to a jury
was unconstitutional:
The act contains no standards at all, nor does it place any conditions
of any kind upon the jury's power to impose costs upon a defendant. .

.

. Certainly one of the basic purposes of the Due Process

Clause has always been to protect a person against having the Government impose burdens upon him except in accordance with the valid
laws of the land. Implicit in this constitutional safeguard is the premise
that the law must be one that carries an understandable meaning with
legal standards that courts must enforce. This state Act as written does
not even begin to meet this constitutional requirement.32
The Court's reasoning in Giaccio would seem to imply-if not
compel-a finding that a death sentence left to the unbridled discretion
of a jury would violate the due process clause. The majority in
McGautha rejected such a broad application of Giaccio, pointing specifically to footnote eight of the opinion where the Giaccio Court stated
26These states (Arizona, Idaho, Nebraska, and Oklahoma) appear to follow a judicially enunciated test whereby a capital jury's verdict may be overturned by an appellate court for abuse of
discretion. See State v. McGee, 91 Ariz. 101, 70 P.2d 261 (1962); State v. Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623,
203 P. 279 (1921); Sundahl v. State, 154 Neb. 550, 48 N.W.2d 689 (1951); Waters v. State, 87
Okla. Crim. 236, 197 P.2d 299 (1948).
2'Brief for NAACP Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae at 63 n. 120, McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).

-382 U.S. 399 (1966).
3

Tit. 5, § 62, [1860] Pa. Pub. L. 382.

32382

U.S. at 403.
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that it was not casting doubt on the constitutionality of allowing "juries
finding defendants guilty of a crime the power to fix punishment within
legally prescribed limits." ' It is doubtful, however, that the Court in
Giaccio meant footnote eight, by itself, to be definitive on the issue of
jury discretion in capital cases. 34 Furthermore, the McGautha juries
would seem to fall outside the limitation of footnote eight because their
sentencing discretion was not confined in any meaningful sense "within
legally prescribed limits."' ' The reasoning of Giacco is all the more
striking when one considers that two members of the Court sought to
base the opinion on the premise that a state cannot constitutionally
impose costs on an acquitted defendant.36 The majority resisted such a
course, though, and held that a statute which fails to place any limitations upon a jury's power to sentence a defendant violates the due process clause.
The Supreme Court in many of its decisions has taken precautions
to insure that state power is exercised through procedures which guarantee fairness and even-handed treatment and which provide a reasonable
degree of certainty in their application. Nearly a century ago in Yick
Wo v. Hopkins37 the Court struck down as violative of the equal protection clause an administrative discrimination against a minority group
under a San Francisco statute which gave the Board of Supervisors
complete freedom in deciding whether or not to license a laundry. The
Court characterized this discretion as a "naked and arbitrary power"
which acknowledged neither guidance nor restraint. 31 In roundly conD1d. at 405 n.8.
'Having regard to the Court's long-standing aversion to unnecessarily deciding serious consti-

tutional questions, Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 338 (1955), it seems unlikely that the Court
would have decided the constitutionality of the standardless death penalty procedure in a case in
which the issue was not even raised. The Court was probably taking care not to express an opinion
on the issue so that it could be decided later in a more appropriate context.
"lt is unclear what the Court meant by the phrase "to fix punishment within legally prescribing

limits." 382 U.S. at 405 n.8. Perhaps the Court was distinguishing a jury whose sentencing discretion is limited by fixed standards from one whose discretion is absolute by stating that there can

be no doubt of the constitutionality of a jury to exercise sentencing discretion

if it is guided by

legally prescribed standards. If this interpretation is correct, the footnote would seem to reinforce
rather than limit the Giaccio opinion and the holding in McGautha must be considered a clear
overruling of Giaccio. More likely the Court was speaking of the range of possible penalties

available to a jury; in determining a sentence a jury can only exercise its discretion within legislatively pronounced maximum and minimum penalties.

'382 U.S. at 405 (Stewart & Fortas, JJ., concurring).
-118 U.S. 356 (1886).
3WId. at 366.
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demning this power, the Court stated, "[O]ur institutions of government
. . . do not mean to leave room for the play of purely personal and
arbitrary power. . . .For the very idea that one man may be compelled
to hold his life . . .at the mere will of another . . . is . . .intolera39
ble.",
More recently, in Louisiana v. United States" the Court has interpreted the due process clause to bar the use of arbitrary state power to
disenfranchise citizens from voting.41 In Louisiana the Court ruled on
the constitutionality of a revision of the Louisiana Constitution which
required every new voting applicant to "be able to understand" as well
as to "give a reasonable interpretation" of any section of the state or
federal constitution "when read to him by a registrar. ' 42 The revised
constitution vested in the voting registrar virtually unregulated power to
determine the manner in which the test would be given, the section of
the constitution the applicant would be required to read, and its correct
interpretation. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, denounced
such a procedure:
The cherished right of people in a country like ours to vote cannot
be obliterated by the use of laws like this, which leave the voting fate
of a citizen to the passing whim or impulse of an individual registrar.
Many of our cases have pointed out the invalidity of laws so completely
43
devoid of standards and restraints.
Both Yick Wo and Louisiana illustrate judicial limitations by the
Supreme Court upon the arbitrary use of power by states against their
citizens. While each state undoubtedly possessed the power to license a
laundry or to legislate voting qualifications, the Court held that this
3

11d. at 369-70 (emphasis added).

40380 U.S. 145 (1965).
"The three judge district court opinion which was affirmed by the Supreme Court noted that
discriminatory vbting qualifications are usually prohibited by the equal protection clause. United
States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 391 (E.D. La. 1963). In this case, however, the discrimination
inherent in the Louisiana Constitution was so unjustifiable that it violated the due process clause.
The court stated:
[S]ome laws may never win constitutional approbation, because they have no rational
relation to a legitimate governmental objective and because the unrestrained discretion
without standards . . . makes them incurably subjective, unreasonable, and incapable
of equal enforcement. . . .The vices cannot be cured by an injunction enjoining [the
statute's] . . . unfair application.
Id. at 391-92.
"2 Act 613, § I(d), [1960] La. Acts 1166, amending LA. CoNsT. art. VIII, § I(d) (1921).

11380 U.S. at 153.
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power had to be administered in a regulated manner which would protect
citizens against arbitrary and capricious decision-making. The common
ground in Yick Wo, Louisiana, and McGautha is the exercise of unguided power by an arm of the state so as to deprive citizens of their
rights.44 The discretion accorded the McGauthajuries in determining a
sentence is arguably just as capricious and unregulated as that denounced by the Court in Yick Wo and Louisiana, for those juries could
have returned a death verdict for any reason or for no reason. Nevertheless, the majority in McGautha, placing much weight on the long history
of the administration of the death penalty, refused to say that such a
procedure violates "due process of law."
The McGautha Court placed much emphasis on the unsuccessful
efforts of sovereigns throughout history to devise adequate guidelines for
use by a capital jury in the sentencing process. While it is true that no
American jurisdiction has ever prescribed standards to guide a capital
jury in its sentencing deliberations, this surely does not mean that the
creation of such standards is impossible. The Model Penal Code drafted
by the American Law Institute has set forth a quite lucid scheme which
enables the trier of fact in a capital case to determine rationally an
appropriate sentence.4 5 A jury under the Model Penal Code is still given
wide discretion, but it may not impose the death penalty unless it finds
one of the specifically enumerated aggravating circumstances and also
finds that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial
to require leniency. Given the existence of a workable system of standards in the Code, it is difficult to understand the McGautha Court's
insistence that drafting such guidelines is an impossibility."
The legislatures of the states of California and Ohio must have had
some criteria in mind, some rational ideas about the objectives of penol"McGautha may be distinguished from Yick Wo and Louisiana in that in McGautha a jury
rather than a mere agency of the state was exercising unregulated discretion. The jury has traditionally occupied a deep-seated, revered position in American legal philosophy, evidenced by the guar-

antees of jury trials embodied in the sixth and seventh amendments to the Constitution. For that
reason the Court may have been reluctant to restrain the jury's conduct.
4MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

"'Paradoxically, the McGautha Court, after proclaiming the impossibility of drafting successful standards for use by a capital jury, included the Model Penal Code provisions in the appendix

to its opinion. The Court obviously recognizes that such guidelines can be formulated, but it is
worried about the practical effect of requiring standards. The motives behind the death penalty are
diffuse and controversial; achieving a legislative consensus on these criteria would indeed be difficult. Furthermore, the Supreme Court would undoubtedly be called upon at a latter date to pass
upon the sufficiency of these standards.
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ogy, when they established the two discretionary penalties for first degree
murder. Instead of cataloging these thoughts, however, the legislatures
of both states elected to let the jury operate in a legal vacuum. As a result
neither state has a regularized system of law and procedure to guide a
capital jury in making such an awesome decision; rather, each follows a
system which allows the final verdict to turn on the whim or caprice of
any juror. Each has licensed a raw power, unguided by any principles,
undirected by any concern for relevant facts, a power which may claim
a person's life for a rational as well as an irrational reason. Such a
procedure cannot be said to come within the bounds of "due process of
law," but must fall into the category of institutionalized arbitrariness.
While McGautha clearly held that the states are not constitutionally
compelled to prescribe standards for capital juries, it by no means indi47
cates that they cannot or should not do so.
ERNEST

S. DELANEY, III

"1The majority opinion in McGautha concedes that prescribing criteria for jury sentencing
discretion "may be a superior means of dealing with capital cases." 402 U.S. at 221.

